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1 Abstract
We take a closer look at the life and legacy of Micheal Milken. We discuss why Michael Milken, also know as
the Junk Bond King, was not just any other King or run-of-the-mill Junk Dealer, but ”The Junk Dealer”. We find
parallels between the three parts to any magic act and what Micheal Milken did, showing that his accomplishments
were nothing short of a miracle. His compensation at that time captures to a certain extent the magnitude of
the changes he brought about, the eco-system he created for businesses to flourish, the impact he had on the
wider economy and also on the future growth and development of American Industry. We emphasize two of his
contributions to the financial industry that have grown in importance over the years. One was the impetus given
to the Private Equity industry and the use of LBOs. The second was the realization that thorough research was
the key to success, financial and otherwise. Perhaps an unintended consequence of the growth in junk bonds and
tailored financing was the growth of Silicon valley and technology powerhouses in the California bay area. Investors
witnessed that there was a possibility for significant returns and that financial success could be had due to the risk
mitigation that Milken demonstrated by investing in portfolios of so called high risk and low profile companies. We
point out the current trend in many regions of the world, which is the birth of financial and technology firms and
we suggest that finding innovative ways of financing could be the key to the sustained growth of these eco-systems.
2 The Price of Junk
The life and legacy of Micheal Milken, his meteoric rise and subsequent fall from fame, can be summarized by
the words, “Someone’s Garbage is Someone Else’s Treasure”. His compensation (salary and bonus) from 1983 to
1984 jumped from $43 million to $123 million reaching a peak of $500 million USD in 1987 (Bruck 1989; Sobel 2000;
End-note 2). During this time, the Junk Bond Market grew from almost non-existent to more than $125 billion
USD (Figure 1; Altunbaş, Gadanecz & Kara 2006a, 2006b; End-note 5).
We take a closer look at the larger than life accomplishments of Micheal Milken and his subsequent rapid decline.
We discuss why Michael Milken, also know as the Junk Bond King, was not just any other King or run-of-the-
mill Junk Dealer, but ”The Junk Dealer”. We find parallels between the three parts to any magic act and what
Micheal Milken did, showing that his accomplishments were nothing short of a miracle. His compensation at that
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time captures to a certain extent the magnitude of the changes he brought about, the eco-system he created for
businesses to flourish, the impact he had on the wider economy and also on the future growth and development of
American Industry. We emphasize two of his contributions to the financial industry that have grown in importance
over the years. One was the impetus given to the Private Equity industry and the use of LBOs (leveraged buyouts:
Kaplan & Stromberg 2009; End-notes 3, 4). The second was the realization that thorough research was the key
to success, financial and otherwise. Perhaps an unintended consequence of the uptick in junk bonds and tailored
financing was the growth of silicon valley and technology powerhouses in the California bay area. Investors witnessed
that there was a possibility for significant returns and that financial success could be had due to the risk mitigation
that Milken demonstrated by investing in portfolios of so called high risk and low profile companies. We point out
the current trend in many regions of the world, which is the birth of financial and technology firms, and we suggest
that finding innovative ways of financing could be the key to the sustained growth of these eco systems.
A big influence on how Michael Milken approached investing and in particular how he assessed the risk of
managing portfolios of junk bonds can be attributed to the book, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience
(Hickman 1958). Looking at his roots, tell us that he probably had honorable intentions to begin with and lost
his way along the journey. We discuss whether he had crossed a certain point of no return, where he had to do
whatever he had to, so as to sustain his creation. Some of the topics we discuss are: The Price of Junk (section 2);
Milken was Milk’em LBOs (Leveraged Buyouts) (section 3); Rescuing Fallen Angels (section 3.3); Milken’s Magic:
The Pledge; The Turn; The Prestige (section 4); The Rise and Fall (section 5); Milken the Felon (or Not?) (section
5.1); Client Loyalty, A Capital Crime (?) (section 5.2); What would you do? What is your verdict? (section 5.3)
Figure 1: The Market for Junk
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2.1 To Yield or Not To Yield
Bonds are an attractive way to raise capital since there is no need to give out firm ownership. The key terminology
about bonds which most of us know, or are sort of familiar with, such as principal, coupon and maturity of a bond
are explained in (Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe 2013). The following equation (eq 1) summarizes the relation between
bond prices and discount rates, which are closely related to interest rates and can also factor in the risk of defaults
on a loan taken by a firm. Clearly we see that there is an inverse relationship between interest rates and bond
prices.
Bond Price or Bond Value =
C
r
[
1− 1
(1 + r)
T
]
+
F
(1 + r)
T
(1)
Here, C is the coupon amount; F is the face value; T is the time to maturity; r is the discount rate for the cash
flows that accrue to the investor in the bond. It is the return the bond holder would obtain by holding the bond till
maturity with all payments made as scheduled and reinvested at the same rate. It can be viewed as the required
return on the bond and is also known as the yield to maturity.
Another central aspect of the working of bond markets was the role played by the credit rating agencies: Fitch,
Moody’s and S&P. These rating agencies evaluated companies on their financial health and assigned them letter-
grade credit ratings of between C and AAA. Firms that were rated low (companies in the B range and below were
deemed as having credit risk, that is an inability to meet the payments on their loans; Kashyap 2019 provides a
discussion of the role perceptions play when we create rankings) by these agencies had significant difficulties raising
capital and bonds issued by these companies were known as junk bonds. (White 2010) is a recent exploration of
how the financial regulatory structure propelled these three credit rating agencies to the center of the U.S. bond
markets and thereby virtually guaranteed that when these rating agencies did make mistakes, those mistakes would
have serious consequences for the financial sector.
3 Milken was Milk’em LBOs (Leveraged Buyouts)
“Finance is an art. Not Yes or No, Right or Wrong. It is an art form, an understanding of who should be the
companies of the future, and how to structure transactions. It is an art form greatly misunderstood.” ----- Michael
Milken, August 25, 1986 (End-note 11). With this fundamental belief, Michael Milken created an eco system for
junk bonds that flourished beyond anyone’s expectations. Suffice it to say he was making the most of the situation
(End-note 12)
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3.1 High School Spirits of A Dynamic Duo
Michael Milken was born in Los Angeles, California on the 4th of July 1946, the American Independence Day.
He was voted “most spirited” and “friendliest” class member in the class of 1964, at which time he was also crowned
prom king. Being too short to join the basketball team, he joined the cheerleading squad, creating controversy
at times, for example, by leading vigorous cheers when his team was ahead 42 to nothing. This should make us
reminiscence a bit about basketball, which was created by guys, who were 5’ 7”, tall and is being played by guys,
who are 7’ 5” tall, with the same basket height. We can infer from this that he was personable, well liked and had
a competitive nature.
The rest of what people said may or may not be entirely correct, depending on when they said it, before or
after, Milken’s rise and fall from fame. “He was extremely bright, with a prodigious memory and a very competitive
spirit. While less athletic than his brother, he exhibited a leadership charisma very early in life. Some called him a
boy wonder” (Bruck 1989; Sobel 2000; End-note 2). Lori Ann Hackel, his high school sweetheart, who later became
his wife, was school princess (End-note 13) and voted “most likely to succeed” (End-note 14).
3.2 A Sweet Deal: Wild Wild West, Starting From the East
California has inspired a few hundred Songs (End-note 15), that should tell us something about the kind of
motivational effects it has on people ... Perhaps, a lot? In an op-editorial written at age 24 in 1970, which Milken
submitted to (and was rejected by) the New York Times, he said, “Unlike other crusaders from Berkeley, I have
chosen Wall Street as my battleground for improving society because it is here that governments, institutions and
industries are financed.” This suggests that he was starting out with the right intentions about doing good for
society. The alternative viewpoint could be that at that age, he knew he would go on to create a multi-billion
dollar industry, get involved in numerous scams and regulatory inquiries and thought it appropriate to send out
misleading messages even before he started. It would be simpler to grant him the benefit of doubt.
He left graduate school and headed to Drexel Firestone, which later became Drexel Burnham Lambert. Drexel
President I.W. Tubby Burnham offered Milken, “One Dollar for Every Three Dollars” (Sobel 2000) when he started
the job. That is, Milken could keep one dollar for three dollars profit he made for the company and that deal stayed
the same when Milken was playing with billions. The kind of deal that would be unheard of these days.
Milken went back to his roots and relocated to Beverly Hills, California. He initially got an opportunity to
be involved in some non-financial restructuring. As operations analyst, Milken surveyed the various business units
and found a hierarchy topped by sales, then by traders in the middle, then researchers on the bottom. Buyers for
products existed, but sales staff was inadequate to develop and distribute new products. Only research could create
a broader market. Thus, over time, he placed an emphasis on research, which was to obtain a proper understanding
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of companies, their capital needs and risk factors. As he rose within the organization, research came to dominate
the organizational order.
3.3 Rescuing Fallen Angels
Milken became the primary player in the secondary junk bond market. He then moved to primary market
offerings. The higher risk of default on low grade bonds was compensated by the higher interest that they paid
(Figures 2, 3; Livingston & Williams 2007; End-note 6). The market overestimated the cost of companies failing to
meet payments on their obligations. Thus bond prices were too low and the quality yield spreads correspondingly
too high. If fewer bonds actually defaulted than were expected to default, then a diversified portfolio comprising
such bonds would outperform a portfolio of investment-grade bonds. The low grade bond market consisted of “fallen
angels”: bonds that had been listed as investment grade but had been downgraded. Milken took an interest in these
companies that had fallen on hard times. In his eyes, these companies had strong assets to back their balance
sheets and could generate strong earnings. The importance of his team’s approach to understanding the value of
companies with extensive research needs to be emphasized here.
Figure 2: Spread The Junk
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Figure 3: Drexel Underwriting Fees
3.4 No Easy Credit: A Blessing to Some
In 1977, only a handful of non-investment grade companies issued bonds. Paradoxically, the most innovative
companies, those with the highest returns on capital and fastest rates of growth, had the least access to capital.
Only 6% of roughly 11,000 corporations were investment grade. Suffice it to say that banks were not giving any
easy credit to corporations in the wild 1970s. This is ironic since Milken’s team gave him full credit, “Someone like
Mike comes along once every five hundred years” (Bruck 1989; End-note 16).
3.5 The Tipping Point
From 1977 to 1981 new issues of junk bonds were less than $1.5 billion per year. We can identify the tipping point
(Gladwell 2006; End-note 17) somewhere after this time since from 1982 to 1987 there were junk bonds everywhere
(Figure 1). (Figure 4) shows that interest rates were at an all time high around 1980 adding to the issue of limited
capital and high interest payments for companies with low investment ratings. In 1983, Drexel issued $1.1 billion in
junk bonds for MCI Communications, another major milestone in the ascent of Milken. By positioning themselves
in the middle of buyers and sellers, Milken and Drexel controlled the market. Drexel also bought back the bonds
they underwrote. This show of faith was instrumental to building credibility and trust, key ingredients in financial
transactions. 60% of Drexel profits in 1985 with underwriting fees of 3% to 4% came from junk bonds.
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Figure 4: Interest Rates and Inflation
4 Milken’s Magic
Every great magic trick consists of three parts or acts (End-note 18). The first part is called "The Pledge". The
magician shows you something ordinary: a deck of cards, a bird or a man. He shows you this object. Perhaps he
asks you to inspect it to see if it is indeed real, unaltered, normal. But of course... it probably isn’t. The second
act is called "The Turn". The magician takes the ordinary something and makes it do something extraordinary.
Now you’re looking for the secret... but you won’t find it, because of course, you’re not really looking. You don’t
really want to know. You want to be fooled. But you wouldn’t clap yet because making something disappear isn’t
enough; you have to bring it back. That’s why every magic trick has a third act, the hardest part, the part we call
"The Prestige".’
Let us now try to identify these three parts in whatever Milken did. If we are able to convince ourselves that
these three acts do exist, then Milken becomes a Magician.
4.1 The Pledge of Michael Milken
This is the simplest or the most basic and obvious aspect of what Milken did. He intervened to match buyer and
seller and depended on an intricate network of reciprocal obligation. He would sell the junk bonds of Corporation
X only if it agreed, at least tacitly, to buy the junk bonds of Corporate Y at an advantageous time. He thought
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of himself as a retailer. The duty of a retailer is to talk to a customer and see what they want. It became clear
to Milken that customers needed products that were not available at that time. The solution was staring them in
the face, they had to create those products. Pledge also means a promise and Milken was a man of his word, “In
my entire career on Wall Street I have never backed out of a transaction once I have agreed to stand up to it, no
matter how onerous it might be”, (Bruck 1989; End-note 2).
4.2 The Turn of Michael Milken
Milken helped connect entrepreneurs, growing businesses and companies in new and unproven industries with
investors. He was responsible for the democratization of credit through the infusion of new capital. It was widely
believed around this time that companies did not need billions in assets and strong credit ratings, all they needed was
Michael Milken. Milken identified a large market without liquidity and provided it. There was an explosive growth
in the junk bond market and Drexel became a leading player in this market. Other firms struggled to duplicate
this success, as Milken was the focal point (Figure 5; Livingston & Williams 2007; End-note 19). In addition, the
easy access to capital might have brought about stable growth and economic calm to American industry in sharp
contrast to the preceding decades (Brunner 1983; Conte, Karr, Clack & Hug 2001; End-note 20).
Figure 5: Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index for Junk Bonds
4.3 The Prestige of Michael Milken
Junk Bonds were used for LBOs and new firms emerged focused on LBOs, creating the modern private equity
(PE) industry. Milken (indirectly through the PE firms), by eliminating corporate largess created by conglomerates,
might have generated large gains for shareholders and the wider economy as a whole. A lot of these after effects can
be studied under the category of unintended consequences which are common in finance and everywhere else as well
(Kashyap 2016, 2016). The American economy has been transformed since the increase of junk bonds through the
widespread use of LBOs. The following sources chronicle the spread of this phenomenon globally and the impact it
has had on the global economic landscape: (Bruton, Dattani, Fung, Chow & Ahlstrom 1999; Leeds & Sunderland
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2003; Froud & Williams 2007; Banerjee 2008; Cumming, Fleming, Johan & Takeuchi 2012; Lerner, Leamon &
Hardymon 2012).
An important question that arises and hints at a big involvement of clever financial innovations is: How much
of the Silicon Valley technology boom was due to junk bonds or more subtly, due to the use of tailored and novel
means of financing? Investors witnessed that there was a possibility for significant returns and that financial success
could be had due to the risk mitigation that Milken demonstrated by investing in so called high risk and low profile
companies. (Ooms, Werker, Caniëls, & Van Den Bosch 2015) suggest that regions’ development paths emerge from
agglomeration patterns and research orientation. They categorize data from thirty-six European regions according
to research orientation and agglomeration. Clearly, they fail to identify the importance of innovative financing
as a contributing factor. (Klepper 2010) analyze the factors behind the historical clustering of the two industries
in Detroit and Silicon Valley and consider some of the effects of capital structure and financing. (Saxenian 2001;
End-note 21) compare Silicon Valley with the Route 128 beltway around Boston, Massachusetts using an alternative
network approach and provide important insights into the local sources of competitive advantage (also, Hulsink,
Manuel & Bouwman 2007). (Phillips 2001) is a study regarding law firms in the Silicon valley region between 1946
to 1996. For other regions in the world that are likened to Silicon valley, see: (Mathews 1997; Patni 1999; Saxenian
& Hsu 2001; Park 2012).
We provide additional illustrations in Appendix 8 that chronicle the growth of silicon valley and
more recently other technology centers around the world. (Figures 6, 7; End-note 7) show the number
of fastest growing electronic firms and the total employment in technology firms in Silicon Valley and Route 128.
(Figures 8, 9; End-note 8) show the population density of law firms and the number of law firms that were founded
and failed. (Figures 10, 11, 12, 13; End-note 9) show the number of transistor and IC firms that entered and exited
the US markets; also shown are the percentage share of IC and transistor firms across Los Angeles, Boston, New
York and Silicon Valley. (Figure 14; End-note 10) shows the growth of Silicon Valley in terms of the number of
firms in various constituent industries from 1950 to 2000.
In all these figures, it is easily seen that there is increased activity during the years when junk bonds and Micheal
Milken were at their peak.
5 The Rise and Fall
Milken cherished his privacy and kept a low profile. His deals were complex and secretive. He was an outsider
in the clubby wall street community. At this peak, he was committing more money than KKR, a leading PE firm
(Fischel 1995; End-notes 2, 22). Using the Elbow is a foul in Soccer, but in an LBO many people get the Elbow
(they are laid off from their jobs). Since self financing is tough, debt financing made up between 60% to 90% of
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the transactions used to acquire majority ownership in public companies. This led to growing negative sentiment
against the junk bond industry by the American public. Some of these dynamics are portrayed in the classic movie
Wall Street, where Gordon Gekko played by Michael Douglas is an iconic corporate raider (End-note 23). This
surge in growing negative sentiment was despite another corner with changing attitudes which held the belief in
agency theory and the responsibility of business: Managers should run the business to benefit stock holders (Ross
1973; Eisenhardt 1989).
5.1 Milken the Felon (or Not?)
With a lot of negative press and attention, the industry attracted the attention of regulators. In the late
1980s federal authorities investigated the business practices of one of Milken’s clients, the prominent financier and
arbitrager Ivan Boesky (End-note 24). Boesky was well-known and respected in the business world, though he was
nicknamed “Ivan the Terrible” for being a ruthless investor (End-note 25). Though as the story unfolds, we will see
that Ivan just turned out to be a terrible insider. We all flout the connections we have in high places. But we need
to realize that people in high places are nobody’s friends; though everyone calls them friends. This aspect of lack of
cooperation among rational individuals is studied in game theory under the heading prisoner’s dilemma (Osborne
& Rubinstein 1994; End-note 26).
In 1986, Boseky was accused by federal regulators of insider trading. Boesky paid a $100 million penalty, and
provided authorities with information on other white collar crimes. This information led authorities to investigate
Milken in 1986 and 1987. Based on their findings, in late 1988 federal regulators charged both Drexel and Milken
in civil court for a range of legal violations. Rudolph Giuliani, politically ambitious, took extreme measures and
invoked RICO Act (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations – meant for organized crime; End-note 27).
Drexel paid a $650 million fine and pleaded guilty to six felonies. Milken did not settle initially and was indicted
on 100 criminal charges. Finally he settled down with a $600 million fine and six charges (described by some as
technical violations, or, honest mistakes with an immaterial impact, with economic around cost of $318,082).
The following questions about Milken bubble to the surface as we try to come to terms with what he did and
how much of those were actually crimes:
1. Was he a greedy hustler? or Was he doing what he believed in and just making a lot of money, perhaps, some
of it through questionable means?
2. Had he crossed the point of no return? If he stopped what he was doing, perhaps, his entire creation could
come crashing down. He was instrumental to the eco system he had created and realizing his pivotal role, he
had to keep going.
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3. He traded for the firm and many times when he traded for his own account, was it only when the firm did
not back him on certain deals?
4. He awarded interests in his investment partnerships to portfolio managers in return for investing in his funds.
Is this a question of simple incentives or was it much more?
5.2 Client Loyalty, A Capital Crime (?)
Judge Kimba M. Wood’s remark when sentencing Milken to ten years in prison was: Milken profited from his
crimes, “not necessarily by lining your pockets directly and immediately, but by increasing your clients loyalty to
you, hence, increasing, your edge over competitors and increasing the likelihood that clients would pay for your
services in the future” (End-note 28).
Unless the remark above was taken out of context, “increasing client loyalty . . . ” seems like the fundamental
objective of any business. Or perhaps, Judge Kimba Wood is referring to Utopian business entities, where there
is no competition but only co-operation (or to be more realistic and less utopian, maybe just a combination of
competition and co-operation, termed co-opetition: Brandenburger & Nalebuff 1996). Perhaps such firms did exist
before, and we just need to find or establish them again.
5.3 What would you do? What is your verdict?
We need to remember this before passing our judgment: There are no good or bad people; just seemingly tough
situations and mediocre role models. We conclude with the following observations in Milken’s Defense:
1. Big companies were not competitive, so they were forced to trim (Budros 1999; Moen 1999; Gandolfi 2014).
2. Milken and his team were matching capital to entrepreneurs who could use it effectively. As he recounted,
once the dust had settled on his legal case and he was serving his sentence, he was proud of most of what
they accomplished (Michaels & Berman 1992).
3. After most Mergers and Acquisitions, companies find ways to increase synergies and improve their bottomline.
A primary strategy for accomplishing this is workforce reduction (O’Shaughnessy & Flanagan 1998; Gutknecht
& Keys 1993; Krishnan & Park 2002; Krishnan, Hitt & Park 2007). Fact: The vast majority of mergers were
not financed with junk bonds. LBOs accounted for only 15% to 25% (the peak 25% happened in 1988) of all
completed mergers (Smith 1992).
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in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Clearly, numerous factors contribute to complex events such as recessions.
Following are some sources that summarize the main events around this time: (Day 1993; Murray 2008);
Early 1980s Recession, Wikipedia Link
21. Route 128, the Yankee Division Highway, is a state highway in the U.S. state of Massachusetts. The area
along the western part of Route 128 is home to a number of high-technology firms and corporations. This
part of Route 128 was dubbed "America’s Technology Highway". In the 1980s, the area was often compared
to California’s Silicon valley. Massachusetts Route 128, Wikipedia Link
22. KKR & Co. Inc. (formerly known as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and KKR & Co. L.P.) is a global
investment firm that manages multiple alternative asset classes, including private equity, energy, infrastructure,
real estate, credit, and, through its strategic partners, hedge funds. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Wikipedia Link
23. Wall Street is a 1987 American drama film, directed and co-written by Oliver Stone, which stars Michael
Douglas, Charlie Sheen, and Daryl Hannah. The film tells the story of Bud Fox (Sheen), a young stockbroker
who becomes involved with Gordon Gekko (Douglas), a wealthy, unscrupulous corporate raider. Wall Street
(1987 Film), Wikipedia Link
24. Ivan Frederick Boesky (born March 6, 1937) is a former American stock trader who became infamous for his
prominent role in an insider trading scandal that occurred in the United States during the mid-1980s. Ivan
Boesky, Wikipedia Link
25. Ivan IV Vasilyevich (25 August 1530 – 28 March 1584), commonly known as Ivan the Terrible ("Ivan the
Formidable" or "Ivan the Fearsome"), was the Grand Prince of Moscow from 1533 to 1547 and the first Tsar
of Russia from 1547 to 1584. Ivan The Terrible, Wikipedia Link
26. The prisoner’s dilemma is a standard example of a game analyzed in game theory that shows why two
completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do
so. Prisoner’s Dilemma, Wikipedia Link
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27. Rudolph William Louis Giuliani (born May 28, 1944) is an American politician, attorney, businessman, and
public speaker who served as the 107th Mayor of New York City from 1994 to 2001. Rudy Giuliani, Wikipedia
Link
28. The Milken Sentence; Excerpts From Judge Wood’s Explanation of the Milken Sentencing: NY Times Article,
Nov 22, 1990
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Figure 14: Growth of Silicon Valley from 1950 to 2000
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